CLASS
SRC'D
SER
REC

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
15 DEC 89
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Dep. Dir.
ADD Adm.
ADD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Insp.
Intell.
Lab.
Legal Coun.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Cong. Affs. Off.
Off. of EEO
Off. Liaison & Int. Affs.
Off. of Public Affs.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

b6
b7C

0354 MRI 01569

OO RUEHFB FBIMM FBICG

DE BOG #0005 3491820

ZNR UUUUU

O 151819Z DEC 89

FM LEGAT BOGOTA (12B-55) (P)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/IMMEDIATE/

FBI MIAMI/IMMEDIATE/

FBI CHICAGO (SG 6B)/IMMEDIATE/

BT

UNCLAS

SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS

CITE: //5700:BOG564.349//

PASS: HAND CARRY TO: CID, CTS, IT-GU, ATTN: SSA [redacted] CID, DS, C/SADTU, ATTN: SSA [redacted] CID, DS, DIU, ATTN: SSA [redacted]

92-19853-X

SUBJECT: "THE "MEDELLIN CARTEL", ET AL; C/SADTO; REI; OO: MM.

RE TELCALLS BETWEEN ALAT [redacted] AND SSA [redacted] AND ALAT [redacted] AND SSA [redacted] DECEMBER 14, 1989.

FOR INFORMATION OF RECEIVING OFFICES ON DECEMBER 14, 1989;

DG APR 16 1990

CALLED:
FS: JKW
By fm Time 330pm

CC to DIU and Colombian/South American Drug Traffics 12/15/89

ICC-RM 5226

[redacted] (PROTECT IDENTITY PER REQUEST), [redacted] WERE INTERVIEWED AT THE LEGAT OFFICE, AFTER BEING REFERRED BY [redacted] AN FBI EMPLOYEE FROM THE PORTLAND DIVISION, WORKING IN A TDY STATUS IN BOGOTA, COLOMBIA, WITH RESULTS AS NOTED BELOW.

b6
b7C
b7D

THEY ARE ORIGINALLY FROM MEDELLIN, COLOMBIA, WHERE [redacted] RESIDE. [redacted] CURRENTLY RESIDING IN MEDELLIN, COLOMBIA, IS A "SICARIO" (HITMAN) FOR PABLO ESCOBAR GAVIRIA [redacted] LIVES IN THE VICINITY OF [redacted] NEAR THE INTERSECTION OF [redacted] MEDELLIN, COLOMBIA, WITH ANOTHER UNKNOWN COLOMBIAN MALE, AKA [redacted] WHO IS ALSO A "SICARIO" WORKING FOR ESCOBAR GAVIRIA.

ON DECEMBER 7, 1989, BOTH INDIVIDUALS WERE DETAINED MOMENTARILY AT THE OLAYA HERRERA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, MEDELLIN, COLOMBIA, BY COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE (CNP), AS THEY WERE RETURNING FROM BOGOTA, AND RELEASED.

b6
b7C
b7D

PAGE THREE DE BOG 0005 UNCLAS

[redacted], WHO RESIDES IN MEDELLIN, CALLED ON THE TELEPHONE [redacted] NO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN.

[redacted] WAS KNOWN TO HAVE AN APARTMENT LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF [redacted] BOGOTA, COLOMBIA. HE HAS BEEN OBSERVED DRIVING [redacted] PICK-UP TRUCK WHILE TRANSPORTING [redacted]

IN ADDITION TO ABOVE INFORMATION, [redacted] PROVIDED BELOW-LISTED INFORMATION ON [redacted] DECLINE TO IDENTIFY ANY FURTHER.

[redacted] IS [redacted] PABLO ESCOBAR GAVIRIA, WHO IS PRESENTLY RESIDING AT [redacted] KNOWLEDGE OF CERTAIN EVENTS PECULIAR TO THE ESCOBAR GAVIRIA ORGANIZATION, TO INCLUDE:

[redacted] WAS ONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO KILLED JORGE

b6
b7C
b7D

ENRIQUE PULIDO, A WELL-KNOWN COLOMBIAN TELEVISION PRODUCER/REPORTER. HE HAS BEEN PAID MILLIONS OF COLOMBIAN PESOS FOR ASSASSINATING AN UNKNOWN GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA GOC) MINISTER.

2. [redacted] PABLO ESCOBAR GAVIRIA APPARENTLY WAS HIDING, AFTER SPENDING SOME TIME IN THE TOWN OF BARBOSA, DEPARTMENT OF ANTIOQUIA, DURING HIS ESCAPE FROM A FARM NEAR THE TOWN OF PUERTO TRIUNFO, [redacted]

[redacted]

3. AN INDIVIDUAL BY THE NAME OF "HENAO", WHO WAS KILLED DURING THE ATTEMPT TO ARREST SUPRA INDIVIDUALS, WAS ESCOBAR GAVIRIA ORGANIZATION'S "BRAIN MAN".

4. THE BOMB PLANTED ON AVIANCA AIRCRAFT HK-1803 WAS DONE BY THE ESCOBAR GAVIRIA ORGANIZATION, IN RETALIATION TO THE KILLING OF "HENAO", BY THE COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE (CNP).

5. ESCOBAR GAVIRIA'S ORGANIZATION HAS ALREADY MADE PLANS TO ATTACK, IN THE HARDEST POSSIBLE WAY, THE GOC, ITS INSTITUTIONS, FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL, IF ESCOBAR GAVIRIA IS ARRESTED AND IN ORDER TO PREVENT HIS EXTRADITION.

6. [redacted] IS

INVOLVED IN SOMETHING "BIG", WHICH INVOLVES THE KIDNAPPING OF AN UNKNOWN SUBJECT, WHICH WILL BE EXCHANGED FOR SOMETHING.

TO THIS EFFECT HE AND THE OTHERS INVOLVED, INCLUDING [redacted] PREPARING FOR THIS OPERATION, WILL BE PAID [redacted] UPON COMPLETION OF THE MISSION.

WHEN QUESTIONED [redacted] ADVISED [redacted] NOT TO ASK ANY QUESTIONS. b6 b7C b7D

7. THE "MEDELLIN CARTEL" IS UPSET AT THE APPARENT COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE "CALI CARTEL" AND THE GOC, IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO "WIPE THEM OUT".

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF [redacted] IS AS FOLLOWS:

PLACE/DATE OF BIRTH [redacted]

HEIGHT

WEIGHT

HAIR

EYES

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF [redacted] IS AS FOLLOWS:

ONE

b6
b7C
b7D

PAGE SIX DE BOG 0005 UNCLAS

PLACE/DATE OF BIRTH:

HEIGHT

WEIGHT

HAIR

EYES

ON DECEMBER 14, 1989, SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT [redacted] FBIHQ, CID, COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, IT-GU, ADVISED ALAT [redacted] THROUGH SECURED COMMUNICATION THAT [redacted]

[redacted]

LEGAT, BOGOTA WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH INDIVIDUALS PROVIDING SUPRA INFORMATION AND WILL REPORT RESULTS OF FUTURE MEETINGS TO INTERESTED OFFICES. INFORMATION ABOVE IS BEING

BT

#0005

NNNN

0290 MRI 01199

OO RUEHFB FBIMM FBICG

DE BOG #0004 3491551

ZNR UUUUU

O 151546Z DEC 89

FM LEGAT BOGOTA (12B-55) (P)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/IMMEDIATE/

FBI MIAMI/IMMEDIATE/

FBI CHICAGO (SQ 6B)/IMMEDIATE/

BT

UNCLAS

SECTION TWO OF TWO SECTIONS

CITE: //5700:BOG564.349//

PASS: HAND CARRY TO: CID, CTS, IT-GU, ATTN: SSA [redacted] CID, DS, C/SADTU, ATTN: SSA [redacted] CID, DS, DIU, ATTN: SSA [redacted]

b6
b7C

SUBJECT: "THE "MEDELLIN CARTEL", ET AL; C/SADTO; REI; OO: MM.

TEXT CONTINUES:

SUBMITTED FOR ACTION AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE.

BT

#0004

NNNN

SSP

CLASS
SRC'D
SER
REC

FD-217

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
17 APR 90 MR 8 28
FBI BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

Dep. Dir.
ADD Adm.
ADD Inv.
Asst. Dir.
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Lab.
Legal Coun.
Off. of Public Affs.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Secy

0258 MRI 01238

OO RUEHFB

DE FBIMM #0005 1071642

ZNY EEEEE

O 171641Z APR 90

FM FBI MIAMI (12H-MM-50238) (N-7) (P)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/IMMEDIATE/

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

CITE: //3460//

PASS: SSA [redacted] DRUG INTELLIGENCE UNIT, CID.

X-pg. 2

[redacted]

SUBJECT: MEDELLIN CARTEL; COLOMBIAN/SOUTH AMERICAN DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS; REI - DRUGS; (OO: MIAMI).

b6
b7C
b7D

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE. SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER RECOMMENDATIONS NOR CONCLUSIONS OF THE FBI. IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED FURTHER WITHOUT CONSULTING FBI/MIAMI. 92-19853-1

A SOURCE [redacted]

[redacted]

2 AUG 21 1990

25

HALLED
IS
MR Time 4:16

2 Rec-DIU

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

PAGE TWO DE FBIMM 0005 UNCLAS E F T O

[redacted] CONTACTED THE MIAMI DIVISION ON APRIL 16, 1990. THE SOURCE'S REPORTING HAS BEEN SUBTANTIATED BY OTHER SOURCES, LIAISON CONTACTS, TECHNICAL MEANS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS IN COLOMBIA AND THE UNITED STATES IS CONSIDERED RELIABLE. THE DATE OF THE INFORMATION IS [redacted]

ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, PABLO EMILIO ESCOBAR-GAVIRIA, [redacted] ARRIVED [redacted] IN THE AREA OF [redacted] COLOMBIA ON [redacted]

[redacted] AS A RESULT, THE GROUP LEFT THE AREA AFTER ONLY ABOUT TWO HOURS [redacted]

ADMINISTRATIVE (FBI DISSEMINATION ONLY):

THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION IS [redacted] WHO COMMUNICATED CRIPTICALLY THE RESULTS OF RECENT DAYS. GREATER DETAILS ARE EXPECTED IN FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS.

BT

#0005

NNNN

FD-36 (Rev. 8-26-82)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
- ☐ Teletype
- ☐ Facsimile
- ☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:
- ☐ Immediate
- ☐ Priority
- ☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
- ☐ TOP SECRET
- ☐ SECRET
- ☐ CONFIDENTIAL
- ☐ UNCLAS E F T O
- ☐ UNCLAS

Date 7/26/90

SSP
CLASS
C'D TO:
R
C

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: LEGAT, BOGOTA (12B-55) (P)

SUBJECT: MEDELLIN CARTEL;
REI-DRUGS;
OO: MIAMI

Enclosed for receiving offices is a U.S. Department of State Cable number 11680 dated 7/25/90.

Enclosure is being submitted for action as deemed appropriate.

1 ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau
(1 - CID, DS, C/SADTU) (Enc. 1)
(1 - CID, DS, DIU) (Enc. 1)
(1 - OLIA, FLU)
2 - Miami (12H-1973) (Enc. 1)
1 - Bogota
DSD/dg
(6)

92-19853-11

b6
b7C

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ (Number) _____ (Time) Per _____

☆ U.S. Government Printing Office: 1984—431-613/6249

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
8 MAY 90 0723
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

SSR
CLASS
SRG'D
SER
REC

Dep Dir.
ADD Adm.
ADD Inv.
Asst. D'r.:
Adm
Crim
Ident
Ins
I
Off. Legal & Int. Affs.
Off. of Public Affs.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

0516 MRI 01706

OO RUEHFB

DE FBIMM #0024 1272231

ZNY EEEEE

O 0722227 MAY 90

FM FBI MIAMI (12H-MM-50238) (N-7) (P)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/IMMEDIATE/

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

CITE: //3460//

PASS: SSA [redacted] DRUG INTELLIGENCE UNIT (DIU), ROOM 5226; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 7325

b6
b7C

(1)

SUBJECT: MEDELLIN CARTEL; COLOMBIAN/SOUTH AMERICAN DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS; REI - DRUGS; (OO: MIAMI).

SECRET SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER RECOMMENDATIONS NOR CONCLUSIONS OF THE FBI. IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED FURTHER WITHOUT CONSULTING FBI MIAMI.

92-198523-15 x 1

RE TELCON WITH [redacted] FBIHQ OPERATION CENTER ON 5/5/90.

1cc Rm5224

REDACTED COPY DISSEMINATED TO STATE DEPT + CIA CNC WITH COVER SHEET 5/9/90 By DIU RVB

RVB 5/8/90

1cc - DIU
FBI

A SOURCE [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted] CONTACTED THE MIAMI DIVISION ON 5/5/90. THE SOURCE'S REPORTING HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIATED BY OTHER SOURCES, LIAISON CONTACTS, TECHNICAL MEANS, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS IN COLOMBIA AND THE UNITED STATES AND IS CONSIDERED RELIABLE. THE DATE OF THE INFORMATION IS 5/5/90.

MESSAGE PASSED BY SOURCE ON 5/5/90 AT 18:15 EST INDICATES THAT PLAN AGAINST U.S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL IS BY PABLO ESCOBAR AND INVOLVES AN ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE OR KIDNAP A U.S. EMBASSY PERSON. DETAILS REGARDING SPECIFIC TARGET(S) METHOD OR TIME PERIOD ARE UNKNOWN. REASON FOR PLANNED ACTION IS RETALIATION FOR RECENT LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS AGAINST CARTEL.

MIAMI DIVISION CONTINUING EFFORTS THROUGH AVAILABLE CHANNELS. TO INQUIRE FOR THE DETAILS WHICH WILL BE PASSED ASAP.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

SOURCE IN THIS MATTER IS [redacted] CODENAMED [redacted]

b2
b7D

BT

#0024

NNNN

SSP
CLASS
SEC'D
SER
REC

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
29 SEP 90 02 31
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
DIVISION NIGHT DUTY OFFICE

Dep. Dir.	
ADD Adm.	
ADD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Servs.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Insp.	
Intell.	
Lab.	
Legal Coun.	
Rec. Mgnt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Cong. Affs. Off.	
Off. of EEO	
Off. Liaison & Int. Affs.	
Off. of Public Affs.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

b6
b7C

0623 MRI 02413

PP RUCNFB FBIMM FBILA OFBIUG PBINY

DE BOG #0002 2712343

ZNR UUUUU

P 282343Z SEP 90

FM LEGAT BOGOTA (12B-55) (12B-MM-50237) (P)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/PRIORITY/

FBI MIAMI/PRIORITY/

FBI LOS ANGELES/PRIORITY/

FBI CHICAGO/PRIORITY/

FBI NEW YORK/PRIORITY/

BT

UNCLAS

CITE: //5700:BOG478W.271//

PASS: CID, DS, DIU UNIT CHIEF [redacted] C/SATU UNIT CHIEF [redacted] MIAMI SSA [redacted] LOS ANGELES SSA [redacted] CHICAGO SSA [redacted]

SUBJECT: THE MEDELLINCARTEL; RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATION (REI); OO: FBIHQ; THE CALI CARTEL; REI; OO: FBIHQ.

FOR INFORMATION OF RECEIVING OFFICES, DURING THE EVENING

FILED IN [redacted]

92-1705-74

DEC 3 1990

Turn to Div

OLIA
CM: 7440

HOURS OF SEPTEMBER 25, 1990, A GROUP OF SOME TWENTY ARMED INDIVIDUALS, CARRYING AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND WEARING UNIFORMS OF THE COLOMBIAN ANTI-NARCOTICS POLICE, ATTACKED A GROUP OF APPROXIMATELY 60 PERSONS ATTENDING A SOCCER MATCH APPROXIMATELY 30 MILES SOUTH EAST OF CALI, COLOMBIA, ON A FARM REPORTED TO BE THE PROPERTY OF [redacted] (A SIGNIFICANT FIGURE IN THE CALI CARTEL). EIGHTEEN PERSONS WERE KILLED AS A RESULT OF THIS ATTACK. BOTH MEDIA AND LOCAL SOURCE INFORMATION ATTRIBUTE THIS ATTACK TO THE MEDELLIN CARTEL WHO WAS ATTEMPTING TO ASSASSINATE [redacted] AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT MEMBERS OF THE CALI CARTEL. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION DEVELOPED BY LEGAT, BOGOTA, AT LEAST SIX OF THOSE KILLED WERE MEMBERS OF THE CALI CARTEL, ALTHOUGH THEIR RELATIVE IMPORTANCE TO THE ORGANIZATION IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.

b6
b7C

INFORMATION DEVELOPED BY LEGAT, BOGOTA AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE U.S. EMBASSY, BOGOTA, COUNTRY TEAM INDICATE THAT A NEW WAVE OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN THE MEDELLIN AND CALI CARTELS HAS BEGUN WITH THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED ATTACK IN RETALIATION FOR NUMEROUS HOMICIDES AND OTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE RECENTLY CARRIED OUT AGAINST THE MEDELLIN CARTEL. IN-COUNTRY SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THAT THE CALI CARTEL IS NEGOTIATING WITH [redacted]

[redacted] TO ELIMINATE PALBO ESCOBAR AND [redacted] A PARAMILITARY, SELF-DEFENSE GROUP, (MOVIMIENTO DE AUTODEFENSA CAMPESINA) WHICH OPERATES IN THE MAGDELENA MEDIO AREA OF COLOMBIA AND WHICH AT ONE TIME WAS ASSOCIATED WITH [redacted] NOW VIEWS ESCOBAR AND [redacted] AS A THREAT TO HIS OPERATIONS IN THE MAGDELENA MEDIO AREA AND HOLDS THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR NUMEROUS MURDERS AND KIDNAPPINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT AGAINST MEMBERS OF HIS ORGANIZATION. [redacted] HAS REPORTEDLY APPROACHED THE CALI CARTEL AND OFFERED TO CAPTURE/ELIMINATE ESCOBAR AND [redacted] THE CALI CARTEL HAS REPORTEDLY TENTATIVELY AGREED TO PAY THREE MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ESCOBAR. SHOULD [redacted] DECIDE TO PURSUE ESCOBAR AND/OR [redacted] HE WOULD HAVE A DECIDED ADVANTAGE OVER THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT DUE TO HIS FAMILIARITY WITH THE MAGDELENA MEDIO AREA AND HIS ABILITY TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM SOURCES AND FORMER ASSOCIATES IN THE MEDELLIN CARTEL.

b6
b7C

RECEIVING OFFICES WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS MATTER.

BT

#0002

NNNN

SSR
CLASS 91F
SRC'D FBI
CER
REC

AIRTEL

8/9/90

Director, FBI

b6
b7C

SACs, Los Angeles
(Attn: SSA [redacted])
Miami (12H-MM-50238)(N-7)

PABLO EMILIO ESCOBAR-GAVIRIA;
MEDELLIN CARTEL;
REI - DRUGS;
(OO: MIAMI)

Enclosed is a copy of Miami airtel dated 7/13/90, captioned as above, with an LHM detailing information taken from [redacted] on 6/21/90.

b2
b7D

On page 7 of the LHM under the heading "Drug Movements," the [redacted] Family and the [redacted] Family are named as receivers and distributors of Escobar's shipments in the United States.

For the investigative assistance of Los Angeles, [redacted], served as Escobar's primary Los Angeles representative as of 9/88. [redacted] supervised 60 employees in Los Angeles as of 6/88. He is [redacted] This information was obtained from [redacted] database. Additional information which may be of assistance to you is available [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

For the information of Miami, the [redacted] Family is believed to be:

MAILED 1
AUG 10 1990
FBI

92-19853-35

1-ENCLOSURE
Enclosure

APPROVED:
Director
Dep. Dir.
ADD-Adm.
ADD-Inv.
Adm. Servs.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Cong. Affs. Off.
Off. of EEO
Off. of Liaison & Int. Affs.
Off. of Public Affs.

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
(Attn: [redacted]
(Attn: [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

b6
b7C

RSH/RLB

PTG:maac(12)
ptg mag

Exec AD Adm.
Exec AD Inv.
Exec AD LES
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Insp.
Intell.
Lab.
Legal Coun.
Off. Cong. & Public Affs.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Off. Liaison & Int. Affs.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

MAIL ROOM RLB

Airtel from Director, FBI, to SACs, Los Angeles, et al, dated 8/9/90
RE: PABLO EMILIO ESCOBAR-GAVIRIA; MEDELLIN CARTEL; REI - DRUGS;
(OO: MIAMI)

[redacted] is a DEA fugitive who may be residing in Colombia. The [redacted] have had residences in the Miami/Hialeah, Florida area. b6 b7C

Any questions concerning the above may be directed to Intelligence Research Specialist [redacted] Room 7325, Extension 6484, Drug Intelligence Unit, FBIHQ.

FD-36 (Rev. 8-29-85)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 7/13/90

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTN: SSA [redacted], DRUG INTELLIGENCE UNIT)

FROM : SAC, MIAMI (12H-MM-50238) (N-7) (P)

PABLO EMILIO ESCOBAR-GAVIRIA;
MEDELLIN CARTEL;
REI - DRUGS;
(OO: MIAMI)
EXPIRES: 10/7/90

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

Enclosed for the Bureau are six (6) copies of an LHM detailing information taken from [redacted] on June 21, 1990.

The information gathered during the debriefing was as a result of requirements set out by the Counter Narcotics Center (CNC) and passed through liaison in Miami on June 20, 1990.

The Miami Division is still in need of feedback from the CNC and/or other users of intelligence provided by [redacted] The Miami Division has been unable to determine the financial worth of recent information provided by the source which Miami understands resulted in very significant raids and seizures of Escobar properties and records in Colombia. The Miami Division would like to reward the source but needs to be able to justify it.

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU:

1. The Bureau is requested to disseminate the enclosed LHM to the CNC and request that they provide feedback regarding the content of the enclosures as well as other intelligence LHMs provided in the past.

2. Disseminate to other divisions or agencies as deemed necessary.

(2) - Bureau (Enc. 6)
2 - Miami
JRI:ksl
(4)

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ (Number) (Time) Per _____

92-11653-35
ENCLOSURE

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please refer to
File No. 12H-MM-50238
(Medellin Cartel)

Miami, Florida

June 25, 1990

PABLO EMILIO ESCOBAR-GAVIRIA
Racketeering Enterprise Investigation

This investigation is predicated by U. S. Attorney General guidelines and corresponding FBI directives for conducting criminal intelligence investigations. The data contained herein is source information that has not been evaluated.

SOURCE

[redacted] reporting has been substantiated by other sources, liaison contacts, technical means, and law enforcement operations in Colombia and the U.S. and is considered reliable. The information was provided on June 21, 1990. The date of information (DOI) is June, 1990.

b6
b7C
b7D

SYNOPSIS

This communication contains psychological and physical health assessments of Pablo Escobar and discusses his personal security and communications arrangements and practices, whereabouts, finances, and relations with other Medellin and Cali group members.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DETAILS

Psychological Assessment

The Colombian Government's (GOC) campaign to locate and apprehend Pablo Escobar has had a very detrimental impact on Escobar's health and judgement. Escobar's behavior and appearance has taken a visible turn for the worst since about a year ago. The breakdown of "peace talks" with the GOC has contributed particularly heavily to this.

Prior to President Bush's visit to Cartagena, Colombia early this year, Pablo Escobar and President Virgilio Barco had reached an agreement to call-off the "war." This agreement was reached through their intermediaries: [redacted] The agreement was reached with the following conditions on Escobar:

b6
b7C
b7D

- Turn in and/or destroy the laboratories;
- Dismantle the Escobar organization;
- Discontinue all cocaine production.

In return, President Barcos had agreed to:

- Not extradite Escobar or his lieutenants;
- Hold their criminal trials in Colombia only; and,
- Escobar's family would be allowed to keep its wealth.

Escobar had already begun to meet his end of the agreement before President Bush's arrival to Colombia. He had turned over several large laboratories to the GOC. But as soon as President Bush left Colombia the GOC went back on its word and started up again. Since then, Escobar "has not cared" and is out of control and demoralized. He has become more aggressive rather than weak in resolve.

The pressure of the campaign has caused him to become more conscious about his personal security arrangements, but his thinking is less rational. In the past he was more calculating and he considered consequences. Now he is reacting more like a caged animal. He trusts very few people because of an increasing paranoia. His circle of trusted friends has shrunk from hundreds to no more than fifteen or twenty. Among them are:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Because Escobar has dedicated himself to the organization's "war strategy" he has left the business to [redacted] and his staff, who manage laboratories (production), transport and sales. Nevertheless, Escobar would immediately negotiate if he got word that the GOC was disposed to.

Physical Health

Several signs of worsening health are evident in Escobar: weight gain, loss of concentration, nervousness, anxiety and gastritis since about a year ago. These maladies and the pressures of being on-the-run over a prolonged time period have caused him to develop bad sleeping habits, and he has aged very quickly lately. His health is deteriorating. The friendly, social person of the past has disappeared. Now he is frequently tired. [redacted] (not further identified) [redacted], and a second unknown individual.

Personal Security

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] The bustle he enjoys and previously had with the large entourages and free reign of Antioquia are now replaced with a small circle of movement and desolation: no crowds, no luxurious beds, not much liquor or women, and very ordinary surroundings.

[redacted] local custom in Antioquia is to wear casual street clothing for business. If in the mountains, jeans are in order.

Before the GOC's campaign, Escobar had control of all of Envigado and Medellin, and much of the Antioquia Province, and moved infrequently. As enforcement efforts intensified his circle of movement became restricted to Envigado, parts of Medellin and some parts of Antioquia. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Rumors that Escobar has altered his physical appearance are untrue beyond the normal changes and disguises he can don without surgery. [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Many people in Medellin and Envigado used to support and help Escobar. But because of the indiscriminate deaths by bombs he has lost about two thirds of his supporters. Those who continue to assist and protect him are largely from the low class. Most people in Antioquia are tired of the "war." Some are openly saying they wish Escobar would be killed to put an end to the war.

Whereabouts

One of Escobar's worries about traveling to other countries is that an ordinary person will give him away without knowing who he is. In Colombia, particularly in the Province of Antioquia, people know and fear him; he has control and enjoys their protection. In a foreign country he could be turned in to authorities as just another Colombian. [redacted] Most recently, several weeks ago, the false news was that he was in Cocorna (near Las Mercedes and Puerto Triumfo). Escobar has not travelled out of Colombia in two years.

Communications

[redacted] They also make use of a network of public telephones and telephone company employees who verify that callers are group members and connect them between public telephones. Since the "La Colina" communications center fell to authorities they have had a poor communications system. They have been unable to set up a similar base. [redacted]

Communications between Pablo Escobar [redacted] is usually by telephone, but it has diminished to sporadic contacts. [redacted] continue to reside in Medellin. [redacted] public telephone to talk with Escobar. [redacted] He is mostly without his family or close friends. b6 b7C b7D

[redacted]

Associates and Personal Relations

Pablo Escobar continues to head the Medellin Cartel because members fear him. But most of them are against his war against the GOC. One member who has openly expressed his discontent is [redacted] The others are not willing to publicly express their opposition or go against Escobar. They are also unwilling to go against Escobar's long-time friends/associates who are with him. Yet, if Escobar were killed by the Colombian army or police, neither [redacted] would retaliate. b6 b7C b7D

Meetings with others in the Medellin Cartel occurs only on the infrequent occasions that Escobar calls on someone. This happens perhaps once or twice a month. Mostly, Escobar meets with other leaders [redacted] It is believed that Escobar himself is not meeting with [redacted]. But [redacted], acting in behalf of the Pablo Escobar organization, is meeting regularly with [redacted] to discuss and coordinate drug trafficking. It is unknown if Escobar is in contact with members of the [redacted] organization.

Other members of the Medellin Cartel have made half-hearted efforts to influence Escobar to stop his campaign of violence. They have not been more forceful for fear of offending him.

b6
b7C
b7D

Of Pablo Escobar's associates, [redacted] is the most respected. In fact, [redacted] is very respected within the Medellin Cartel. He is liked and is considered very intelligent and a perfectionist who carries out tasks well. [redacted] also likes to invest money, avoids public spectacles, and does not like violence (although he is capable of it, but does not use it indiscriminately like [redacted] is considered the logical replacement if Pablo Escobar were to die. [redacted] has been overheard several times to say that he would get out of the drug trade and go into legitimate businesses, if he could. It is understood that he continues only out of loyalty to Escobar, while Escobar is alive.

Similarly, [redacted] personality is very much like [redacted], wants [redacted] to stay in drug trafficking and is prone to violence, like Pablo Escobar.

Drug Movements

[redacted] is in charge of the drug trafficking business while Pablo Escobar is preoccupied with his legal problems. He is assisted by [redacted] who handle accounting and money laundering. [redacted] is charged with assembling the drugs and shipping them out of Colombia. And members of the [redacted] family and the [redacted] family receive and distribute the shipments once they reach the U.S.

Finances

The Escobar organization hides its assets by owning corporations indirectly. The organization deposits its profits in banks [redacted]

[redacted]

Turf War with the Cali Cartel

One of the thorns in Escobar's paw is that he is convinced that [redacted] the *Direccion Administrativa de Seguridad* (DAS), is allowing the Cali Cartel to operate unhindered, while pressuring the Medellin groups. Escobar would be less angry about law enforcement pressures if all traffickers were being targeted.

The acrimony between the Medellin and the Cali groups began not as a turf war over New York but as a falling-out between the Pablo Escobar and Cali Cartel members [redacted]

The trouble started several years ago when Pablo Escobar wanted to syndicate all drug traffickers in Colombia to fix the price of cocaine. All the traffickers went along with Escobar except the [redacted] groups. [redacted] are very close friends of [redacted] who influenced [redacted] to not go along with Escobar's plan. Cali fired the first salvo by detonating a bomb in the Monaco Building in Medellin, where Escobar resided about four years ago. The "New York turf war" was a consequence of the "price war."

b6
b7C
b7D

Since then, a treaty was reached sometime in November or December of 1989, between [redacted] representing the Medellin groups, and [redacted] representing the Cali groups, that has held to date. In the treaty Pablo Escobar is allowed by Cali to fight only one front, against Colombian authorities, as long as he does not attack Cali members.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Reporting Agent

The information contained in this report was acquired by SA [redacted] of the Miami Division, on June 21 and 22, 1990 during a debriefing of [redacted] codenamed [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

FD-36 (Rev. 8-26-82)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
- ☐ Teletype
- ☒ Facsimile
- ☐ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:
- ☐ Immediate
- ☐ Priority
- ☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
- ☐ TOP SECRET
- ☐ SECRET
- ☐ CONFIDENTIAL
- ☐ UNCLAS E F T O
- ☐ UNCLAS

Date 8/21/90

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: LEGAT, BOGOTA (12B-55) (P)

SUBJECT: MEDELLIN CARTEL;
REI-DRUGS;
OO: MIAMI

Enclosed for receiving offices are two newspaper articles, El Colombiano dated 8/16/90 and El Tiempo dated 8/17/90.

Enclosures are being submitted for action as deemed appropriate.

[redacted]

1 - ENCLOSURES

92-19853-39

b6
b7C

(3) - Bureau
(1 - CID, DS, C/SADTU) (Enc. 1)
(1 - CID, DS, DIU) (Enc. 1)
(1 - OLIA, FLU)
2 - Miami (JIG)(Enc. 1)
1 - Bogota
DSD/dg
(6)

SEP 5 1990

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ (Number) (Time)

[redacted]

☆U.S. Go[redacted]: 1984—431-613/6249

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

newspaper, city and state.)

Date:
Edition:

Medellín, jueves 16 de agosto de 1990

EL COLOMBIANO 3A

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office:

En Operación Apocalípsis I

Auto de detención contra cinco de los capturados

BOGOTA, (Colprensa). Cinco de las 21 personas capturadas en el Magdalena Medio en desarrollo de la "Operación Apocalípsis I" montada para capturar a Pablo Escobar Gaviria, fueron cobijadas ayer con auto de detención.

Las restantes 16 personas fueron puestas en libertad al no poderseles demostrar cargos que los implicaran en los delitos imputados a la red terrorista que tenía la base de operaciones en la Hacienda Nápoles, de Puerto Triunfo.

Uno de los sindicados con auto de detención en su contra, es Hernán Darío Henao Quintero, alias "H.H.", quien las autoridades señalan de ser cuñado de Escobar Gaviria y como pieza clave de la organización terrorista que el Cartel de Medellín había instaurado en el Magdalena Medio.

Así mismo, otros cobijados con medida de aseguramiento son Hugo Jaramillo Buitrago, alias "Mantequillo", sindicado de coordinar numerosos actos terroristas en Medellín y otras ciudades del país; Carlos Taborda Pérez, alias "El Negro", jefe de un grupo de seguridad de Escobar en el oriente antioqueño, y Jorge Echeverry Londoño, químico del Cartel de Medellín y según la Dijin responsable de una negociación de 9.000 kilos de dinamita.

También figura José Eduardo Reyes, vigilante de los sitios adyacentes a la hacienda Nápoles.

En la lista de excarcelados aparecen José David Cortés Mejía, quien había sido señalado como el médico al servicio de Escobar; Julio Jaime Betancurt Vélez, Telésforo Linares Tejedor, Jaime Orozco, José Miguel Posada Palacios, Iván Gómez Díaz, Jesús María Giraldo Domínguez, alias "Chucho", Marcelo Soto Pamplona y Wilson Velancia, alias "Ricardo".

Otros son Inocencio Osorio Medina, alias "El Ché", William Herrera Carreño, alias "Daniel", Carlos Albeiro Quintero Betancurt, alias "Topo Gigio", Gildardo Rodríguez, Gilberto Antonio Giraldo Martínez, Over Londoño Torres y Luis Eduardo Castrillón Granada.

La "Operación Apocalípsis I" se llevó a cabo a mediados de julio en una vasta región del oriente antioqueño, en particular en el territorio de jurisdicción de la gigantesca Hacienda Nápoles, desplegada por el Cuerpo Elite de la Policía Nacional en procura de capturar a Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria, acción que sin embargo no se cumplió en su objetivo central.

Las personas capturadas se encuentran privadas en la Cárcel Nacional Modelo.

index

92-1 9853-39

ENCLOSURE

Libre red de inteligencia del Cartel de Medellín

Todos los miembros de la red de inteligencia y comunicaciones del Cartel en Medellín en Bogotá, encabezada por un ex oficial de la Policía, fueron puestos en libertad por el juez segundo de Orden Público de Bogotá, Rubén Darío Ceballos.

El funcionario, que con la revocatoria de los autos de detención produjo su última providencia antes de dejar el cargo, consideró que "la confesión sin presencia de abogado y mediante coacción no tiene validez".

Desvirtuó así los resultados de la Operación Onix que en marzo permitió a la Policía desarticular la red y poner al descubierto una peligrosa infiltración que permitía al narcotráfico conocer por anticipado algunos de los planes operativos del Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) y de la XIII Brigada del Ejército.

La orden de libertad favorece, en primer término, a Eduardo Bautista Ortiz, 'Capi Ortiz' o 'Petete', quien según la Dirección de Policía Judicial e Investigación (Dijin) era el jefe regional de la red.

También quedó sin efecto la detención de José Noé Barreto Rodríguez, un ex oficial de la Policía que en abril de 1978 estuvo involucrado en el caso de la masacre del barrio Contador en Bogotá. Barreto, 'Lázaro', era señalado como subjefe regional del Cartel.

Las demas personas beneficiadas con la revocatoria de los autos y las tareas que cumplían, según los organismos de inteligencia, son las siguientes:

Luis Alberto Gómez Guzmán, 'Crithoper', coordinador de la red y responsable de los pagos a quienes la integraban, según los organismos de inteligencia.

Guillermo Rodríguez Ortiz, 'El Mono', responsable de las radiocomunicaciones; Manuel Benítez Sierra, 'Guri-Guri', operador del equipo radio, y Alba Lucía Gómez, 'Elvira', responsable del apoyo logístico.

Se ignora que tratamiento le dio el juez al decomiso de 14 teléfonos portátiles, teléfonos unicelulares y otros equipos conectados clandestinamente.

Pocos días después de su captura había sido puesta en libertad Alba Belén Estévez, acusada en principio de ser la financista de la organización. El juzgado no halló pruebas de peso en su contra.

Con su decisión, el juez acogió los argumentos jurídicos expuestos por los abogados Nury Tole Bahamón, Gustavo Salazar Pineda y Carlos Martínez Palacios.

Según sus planteamientos, la manera como fue conseguida la confesión de los capturados no es confiable procesalmente ni se ajusta a los requisitos de ley.

Hasta el momento se ignora la suerte dentro del proceso de Ignacio Alfonso Albarracín Rodríguez, 'El Cachaco', quien según los servicios de inteligencia de la Policía era una de las personas encargadas de entregar a los narcotraficantes documentos secretos del Ejército, la Policía y el DAS.

Dentro de la estructura de la red se hallaba el periodista independiente Rubén Darío Carrillo, asesinado hace tres meses en Envigado.

Paralelamente era investigada la posible vinculación de ocho abogados que aparecían en el organigrama como Ovidio, Lizandro, Héctor Navas, Arniegas, Aura, Vega, Navarrete y Palacios.

Los capturados durante la Operación Onix habían caído en poder de la Policía en desarrollo de 49 allanamientos realizados en Bogotá.

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Date: 8/17/90
Edition: EL TIEMPO, BOGOTA,
Title: 8A
Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office:
Indexing:

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

FD-36 (Rev. 2-2-87)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
- ☐ Teletype
- ☐ Facsimile
- ☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:
- ☐ Immediate
- ☐ Priority
- ☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
- ☐ TOP SECRET
- ☐ SECRET
- ☐ CONFIDENTIAL
- ☐ UNCLAS E F T O
- ☐ UNCLAS

Date 4/19/90

To : DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTENTION: CID/DIU, SSA [redacted] RM 7325)

From : SAC, MIAMI (12H-50238) (N-7) (P)

Subject :

[X] MEDELLIN CARTEL; REI (OO: MIAMI)
[ ] CALI CARTEL; REI (OO: MIAMI)
[ ] NORTH COAST TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS; REI (OO: MIAMI)
[ ] EL DORADO/BOGOTA CARTEL; REI (OO: MIAMI)
[ ] CUBAN TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS; REI (OO: MIAMI)

Enclosed for FBIHQ/receiving offices is __1__ copy of __1__ [X] LHM, __1__ [X] DEA-6, _____ [ ] Other:

REQUEST OF FBIHQ:

[X] For information only.
[ ] Disseminate to appropriate agencies.
[X] Other: See Page Two.

(3) - Bureau (Enc. 2) ENCLOSURE
2 - Boston (Enc. 2)
2 - Chicago (Enc. 2)
2 - El Paso (Enc. 2)
2 - Houston (Enc. 2)
2 - Jackson (Enc. 2)
2 - Los Angeles (Enc. 2)
2 - New Orleans (Enc. 2)
2 - New York (Enc. 2)
2 - Phoenix (Enc. 2)
2 - San Diego (Enc. 2)
2 - Seattle (Enc. 2)
2 - WMFO (Enc. 2)
5 - Miami
(1 - 12H-MM-50238 Main)
(1 - 12HOMM-50238 SUB A)
(1 - 12H-MM-50238 SUB C)
(1 - 12H-MM-50238 SUB AA3)
(1 - 12H-MM-50238 SUB LL3)

Show [redacted] how to scan to CIA Copy to 1 file PMB 4/25

92-1853-41

12 APR 24 1990

JRI:mcj
(32)

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ Per _____
(Number) (Time)

*U.S. Government Printing Office: 1989-241-706/08026

12H-MM-50238

ADMINISTRATIVE:

The source in this matter is [redacted] codenamed [redacted] debriefed by SA [redacted] on April 4, 1990.

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

1. PROGRAM CODE	2. CROSS FILE / RELATED FILES	3. FILE NO.	4. G-DEP IDENTIFIER
SFIP-3000-39	☐ 12H-MM-50238 ☐ " SUB A ☐ " SUB C ☐ " SUB AA3 ☐ " SUB LL3	GFG1-87-8001	IL1-CO

5. BY: [redacted]
AT: FBI MIAMI

6. FILE TITLE: FBI/DEA JOINT DRUG INTELLIGENCE GROUP (JDIG)

7. ☐ Closed ☐ Requested Action Completed ☐ Action Requested By:

8. DATE PREPARED: April 17, 1990

9. OTHER OFFICERS: SA [redacted]

10. REPORT RE: Debriefing of FBI source on April 4, 1990.

DETAILS:

Attached is an FBI Letterhead memo, which contains a source description, synopsis, details, and other pertinent information.

INDEXING SECTION:

1. [redacted]

2. PABLO EMILIO ESCOBAR-GAVIRIA, NADDIS #1020528. Along with [redacted] has moved base of operations and hideouts [redacted]

[redacted]

11. DISTRIBUTION:	12. SIGNATURE (Agent)	13. DATE
REGION AMRI/OC/ZE DISTRICT FBI MIAMI OTHER G1/GP2	[redacted]	4/18/90 15. DATE 4/18/90

DEA Form 6 (May 1980)

DEA SENSITIVE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
This report is the property of the Drug Enforcement Administration.
Neither it nor its contents may be disseminated outside the agency to which loaned.
Previous edition may be used.

92-19853-41
ENCLOSURE

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

b6
b7C
b7D

In Reply, Please refer to
File No. 12H-MM-50238
(Medellin Cartel)

Miami, Florida

April 5, 1990

PABLO EMILIO ESCOBAR-GAVIRIA

Colombian/South American
Drug Trafficking Organizations
Racketeering Enterprise Investigation

This investigation is predicated by U. S. Attorney General guidelines and corresponding FBI directives for conducting criminal intelligence investigations. The data contained herein is source information that has not been evaluated.

SOURCE

reporting has been substantiated by other sources, liaison contacts, technical means, and law enforcement operations in Colombia and the U.S. and is considered reliable. The information was provided on April 4, 1990.

SYNOPSIS

Pablo Escobar and have been forced into a reduced circle of movement around Medellin, Colombia. They have also set up new administrative offices in Medellin.

Because of law enforcement pressure most members of the Medellin Cartel, including Escobar's group, have moved their processing and shipping operations to Ecuador and Bolivia, and are shipping directly from those two countries.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Several Antioquia politicians won senate and representative seats in the Colombian Government. They represent the Colombian Liberal Party (PLC). Their campaigns were assisted by Escobar's group. Also, Escobar's [redacted] who is a personal friend of Colombian President Barco, has been [redacted]

DETAILS

ORGANIZATION

Since recent raids on "La Colina," and "La Setenta," the former office site and attending communications/security center in Envigado, Pablo ESCOBAR [redacted] have been forced to move their base of operations and hideouts [redacted]

[redacted]

Barring renewed Government activity ("war") against Escobar and [redacted] they intend to

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

OPERATION

The Pablo Escobar group and many other Medellin traffickers have been busy moving their operations out of Colombia to Ecuador and Bolivia, where law enforcement is lax. They have set up large-scale labs in those countries. Product (cocaine) shipments now are largely being made directly out of those countries as well, rather than out of Colombia.

FINANCES

Pablo Escobar and [redacted] have a substantial bank account [redacted]

POLICE/PUBLIC CORRUPTION

[redacted] recently gained a seat as representative in the Colombian House of Representatives (*Camara de Representantes*). His campaign was helped with over ten million pesos. It was [redacted] the source believes, who tipped off Escobar and [redacted] of the impending law enforcement action in January or February of this year, when the Colombian Army, [redacted] raided "La Colina" and "La Setenta." [redacted] became aware of irregular, preparatory troop movements in the town and immediately alerted Escobar.

Other Antioquia Department politicians helped successfully by Escobar and [redacted] in the recent 1990 elections are:

— [redacted]
—
—
—

Despite [redacted] public denials, he has been [redacted] is no friend of the Medellin Cartel, he has remained helpful to certain Cartel members who are [redacted] personal friends, such as [redacted] who functions as Escobar's [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

SECURITY

The Army's attention on "La Colina" and "La Setenta" has deprived them of their former, wider area of influence in the Medellin-Envigado area and has forced them to diminish their circle of safe movement

continues to in behalf of Pablo Escobar and The owner of this office is who frequents it often and is aware of organizational function are used to Occasionally, Escobar and will also use

are probably unaware of the use to which they are put, acting in behalf of Escobar and uses

ASSESSMENT OF GROUP

The Medellin Cartel has fragmented as a result of law enforcement pressure. Many of the formerly close-allies of the Escobar leadership have quietly disengaged and gone solo, at least during the continueing hostilities with the Government. For the moment, at least, they are forming new alliances with other, less-strident groups, and are moving their operations out of Colombia.

b6
b7C
b7D

ADMINISTRATIVE

REFERENCE MAPS

1. See 1989 map of the Medellin area [redacted] 1:25,000 scale; for reference to Medellin, Colombia streets mentioned in this report (H-I/4 crossfix).

2. See 1982 map the Department of Antioquia, by the Ministry of the Treasury and Public Credit (*Ministerio de Hacienda y Credito Publico*), "Agustin Codazzi" Geographic Institute (*Instituto Geografico "Agustin Codazzi"*), Second Edition; 1:500,000 scale; for reference to [redacted] and surrounding area (coordinates 5 deg. 53 min. N/74 deg. 57 min. W)

SOURCE COMMENTS

The precise locations [redacted] could not be determined , but everyone in the [redacted] area is aware of their locations because the families are well known and wealthy.

If Escobar and [redacted] go through with their plan, the increased activity for the daily needs of the entourage, such as meals, should be detectable. A few mon-and-pop restaurants may be available in [redacted] A better selection can be found in [redacted] Still, restaurants are not large or plentyful. Preparing an order for thirty or forty people is bound to strain their normal capacity and raise eyebrows. Alert [redacted] may be able to detect such increased activity and recognize the food messengers/bodyguards of the group, who could then be surveilled to the hideout.

FD-36 (Rev. 11-17-88)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
- ☐ Teletype
- ☐ Facsimile
- ☐ ~~AIRTEL~~

PRECEDENCE:
- ☐ Immediate
- ☐ Priority
- ☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
- ☐ TOP SECRET
- ☐ SECRET
- ☐ CONFIDENTIAL
- ☐ UNCLAS E F T O
- ☐ UNCLAS

Date 3/7/90

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (12H-MM-50238) (N-7) (P)

[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
PABLO EMILIO ESCOBAR-GAVIRIA (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
CARLOS OCTAVIO PIEDRAHITA-TABARES (DECEASED) (GROUP);
JOSE GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-GACHA (DECEASED) (GROUP);
[redacted] (GROUP);
MEDELLIN CARTEL;
COLOMBIAN/SOUTH AMERICAN
DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS;
RACKETEERING ENTERPISE INVESTIGATION
(OO: MIAMI)

b6
b7C

92-19853-47

1cc and 2 encls. detached and retained in DIU, Room 7325.

(2) - Bureau (Enc. 3) ENCLOSURE
2 - Miami
DL:mcj
(4)

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ (Number) (Time) Per _____

FBI/DOJ

Enclosed for the Bureau are three copies of a letterhead memorandum outlining the Miami Division's initiation of a Racketeering Enterprise Investigation (REI) directed at the criminal activities of the so-called "Medellin Cartel."

FBIHQ is requested to obtain authorization for the following REI:

The purpose of the REI is to obtain information concerning the nature, structure, composition, and activities of the Medellin Cartel operations operating in the United States, particularly in the Miami Division's jurisdiction. The Cartel groups targeted by the Miami Division are those consisting of at least two or more persons engaged in a continuing pattern of illegal drug trafficking for the purpose of obtaining profits through their racketeering activities. The long range objective of this effort will be the detection and prosecution of the criminal members of the enterprise, as well as the identification and seizure of their assets.

The Miami Division's Medellin Cartel - REI is designed to consolidate information on Medellin groups previously collected under the Colombian/South American Drug Trafficking Organizations - REI. It will also continue to collect and update the identity of the members of the respective organization or enterprise and the role these individuals play in furtherance of the criminal enterprise. The REI will also serve to gather, collect, and analyze the financial enterprise and develop a comprehensive investigative strategy based on the past and current activities of the organization. These intelligence efforts will result in the opening of substantive drug cases based on a substantial predicate and cause a more efficient use of FBI resources.

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please refer to
File No. 12H-MM-New

Miami, Florida

March 1, 1990

MEDELLIN CARTEL;
Colombian/South American
Drug Trafficking Organizations
Racketeering Enterprise Investigation

SYNOPSIS

Practically all Colombian/South American drug trafficking organizations with operations in the South Florida area are affiliated with, or subcontract their services to one of the Medellin Cartel members.

The members of the Medellin Cartel frequently use North Coast or other independent groups on an *ad hoc* basis for specialized tasks, such as transportation or money laundering. They began their drug trafficking with marihuana during the early marihuana trading days. In recent years, the cartels have turned to trafficking the more lucrative and easier to transport drug—cocaine. They are currently expanding their markets into Europe, where demand is growing. The North Coast groups continue to traffic in marihuana as well.

Members. The directors of this cartel are Pablo Emilio Escobar-Gaviria, [redacted] Other influential leaders of this group are [redacted] Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez-Gacha, also known as (aka) "El Mejicano" was killed in a shoot-out with Colombian police in December, 1989. His successor is believed to be [redacted] The following is the current list of Medellin based narcotics organizations:

b6
b7C

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
This document contains information regarding subjects under investigation by the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

92-19853-47
ENCLOSURE

[redacted] (Group); [redacted] (Group); [redacted] (Group) [redacted] (Group); [redacted] (Group); [redacted] (Group);

DETAILS

The so-called "Medellin Cartel" was reportedly born out of an alliance called *Muerte a Secuestradores* (Death to Kidnapers), formed in the early 1980's by [redacted] Pablo Emilio Escobar-Gaviria, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez-Gacha (deceased) and [redacted] (incarcerated). The purpose of the organization was to unite against a number of Colombian kidnaping gangs which were targeting the families of wealthy drug traffickers and businessmen. b6 b7C

During this period, [redacted] was kidnaped and held for ransom. In order to prevent other incidents from occurring, the traffickers decided to retaliate with as much force as possible. Each of the principals in the drug organizations was required to contribute a certain amount of money and manpower for joint operations against the kidnapers.

With time, the Medellin traffickers began to unite in other forms, sometimes by "pooling" their shipments, each one putting only a set quantity of kilograms in the load to insure that none of the shippers sustained a single, large loss in case of seizure. At other times they shared successful transportation lines. This eliminated any real sense of competition as the traffickers discovered there were a great many markets in a number of cities in the U.S., and no real need to fight among themselves.

Over the next few years, the leadership of the cartel began setting prices for cocaine for resale and transportation. Contributions were requested, and continue to this day, for such matters as funds to bribe Colombian government officials and legislators, criminal defense funds for incarcerated or extradited traffickers, and the like.

The identified directors of the Medellin Cartel are Pablo Emilio Escobar-Gaviria, [redacted] Another top trafficker, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez-Gacha, recently killed in a shootout with Colombian police, was also one of this cartel's leaders. Other highly significant directors of this cartel have been identified as [redacted] b6 b7C

This cartel has been perceived in the past to be the most important and significant of the Colombian drug organizations. By far the most widely known and documented, it is now viewed as having set the pace for the other organizations, but no longer as powerful as it once was.

Pablo Escobar-Gaviria and other top leaders must continue to maintain a very low profile due to the pressure of American and Colombian law enforcement authorities. They have, in so doing, turned over the reins to other individuals who are managing their affairs. Now there are indications that they are not satisfied with what has taken place over the past couple of years.

Other traffickers from the Medellin area appear also to have become dissatisfied with the cartel's current leadership, saying that they have been forced into contributing to the cartel's "assessments," rather than voluntarily providing monies as in the past. A number of groups have reportedly started supporting the "Cali Cartel" in its turf war with the Medellin groups; they believe the Medellin traffickers have "robbed" many of their customer groups by falsely claiming that shipments were intercepted and then selling their client's cocaine in the U.S. and Europe.

This cartel operates principally out of Medellin, Colombia. The organizations which make it up maintain central "offices," which they utilize to make and receive long distance telephone calls (and occasionally, facsimile transmissions) from their representatives in cities in the United States, Western Europe and Asia.

The Medellin Cartel had established strong ties to former Panamanian strongman, Manuel Antonio Noriega, who used his power and influence to corrupt Panama into a heaven for Colombian drug traffickers. Noriega assisted the likes of Pablo Escobar and others in the Medellin Cartel to evade Colombian and U.S. authorities by providing sanctuary in Panama. More importantly, Noriega's regime corrupted the Panamanian financial system into a huge money laundering operation at the service of drug traffickers.

The new government and social order in Panama will surely throw the Medellin Cartel's money laundering and banking operations for a tail spin—until the Cartel is able to replace lost Panamanian resources elsewhere.

In Miami, [redacted] prominent among Colombians in the South Florida area, have been identified as the principal representatives of [redacted] and his associates [redacted] Pablo Escobar-Gaviria and [redacted] reside in the Miami area. b6 b7C

The two direct the receipt and distribution of multi-hundred kilogram quantities of cocaine sent to the U.S. by the member groups of the "Medellin Cartel." They have individuals working for them in the cities of Miami, New York City and Los Angeles. Among their associates in the Miami area are top Miami transporters [redacted] his partner [redacted] LNU (last name unknown), with whom they have done business without problems for over ten years. [redacted] Miami operation employs between eight to ten persons who actually receive and distribute. In New York they are represented by a Colombian national named [redacted] who in turn supervises about ten others engaged in the distribution in the New York area. Three other [redacted] known only as [redacted] represent [redacted] U.S. operation in the Los Angeles area. b6 b7C

The Medellin Cartel has suffered serious setbacks in recent months, what with the death of Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha and Colombian President Barco's vigorous campaign to locate and apprehend the remaining Medellin kingpins. Unverified information from one reliable source indicates that Pablo Escobar and [redacted] are shipping no more than 200-500 kilos of cocaine per month—less than ten percent of the amounts of cocaine they routinely shipped to the U.S. before their operations were disrupted by their "wars" with Cali and the Colombian Government. b6 b7C

Another individual identified as a U.S. representative of the Medellin Cartel is [redacted] identified by several sources as Pablo Emilio Escobar-Gaviria's man in Miami. The following description of the Escobar-Gaviria organization is presented as a generic example of the organizational structure of a typical Medellin Cartel Group: b6 b7C

ORGANIZATION

Pablo Emilio Escobar-Gaviria, together with [redacted] are known throughout the Colombian underworld as "Los Pablos." Their organization is regarded by most observers to be among the most powerful, wielding political as well as economic power within the Republic of Colombia. Its representatives and distributors work primarily in Miami, New York, Chicago, Boston and Los Angeles. This organization controls production, transportation, and, with the [redacted] and Rodriguez-Gacha groups, generally sets the prices for cocaine for the rest of the Cartels. Escobar-Gaviria has become a household name in Colombia due to his past service as an alternate in that country's senate and his past frequent public appearances. b6 b7C

Key/Dominant Figures of the Organization:

[redacted] also known as (aka) [redacted]
Lives in Miami, Florida. Involved in air smuggling. No other identifying information available.

[redacted] aka [redacted]
DOB [redacted] with alternate DOBs [redacted] Addresses in Cartagena and Medellin, Colombia and Miami, Florida. Reportedly also a key/dominant figure in the Rodriguez Gacha organization. b6 b7C

[redacted]
Lives in Florida (exact location unknown). Dealer/distributor. No other identifying information available. May be identical to [redacted] also known as [redacted] has addresses in Houston and Sugarland, Texas, and Miami, Florida.

Key/Dominant Figures Not Further Identified:

[redacted]
Possibly identical to [redacted] DOB [redacted] also known as [redacted] b6 b7C

Members:

[redacted] AKA [redacted]
DOB [redacted] Addresses in Sydney, Australia and Medellin and Envigado, Colombia. b6 b7C

[redacted]
DOB [redacted] Addresses in Miami and Hialeah, Florida and Medellin, Colombia.

Members Not Further Identified:

[redacted]

[redacted]
DOB [redacted] Lives in Medellin, Colombia. b6 b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] Addresses in Hialeah and Miami, Florida and Barranquilla, Colombia.

[redacted] Lives in Medellin, Colombia.

[redacted] Lives in Envigado, Colombia.

b6
b7C

[redacted] DOB [redacted] Lives in Miami, Florida.

[redacted]

Members With Last Name Unknown

[redacted] Lives in Medellin, Colombia.

[redacted]

OPERATION

Escobar-Gaviria's group was among the first to organize itself like a corporation, dispatching representatives or "managers" to the United States in order to serve in various cities for a one or two year period. These representatives are given sums of two and three hundred thousand dollars to purchase or rent "stash" houses in quiet suburban neighborhoods (preferably homes with an enclosed/attached garage), purchase a number of vehicles to move the group's cocaine, and recruit a number of individuals to serve as guards for the "stashes," along with couriers who travel between the various U.S. cities in which the group operates.

FINANCES

Escobar-Gaviria's group was also among the first to institute a system of internal audits, dispatching on an irregular basis trusted representatives (sometimes attorneys or professional accountants) who unexpectedly appear in the U.S. to check on each manager's performance and inventory.

POLICE/PUBLIC CORRUPTION

Escobar-Gaviria's group, as well as other Medellin cartel members, have established a network of contacts within the Colombian government enabling them to effectively avoid capture.

COMMUNICATIONS

Members and representatives of this organization have been utilizing public telephones, pagers and high frequency radio equipment to communicate among themselves and with principals in Colombia.

CHARACTERISTICS

The Escobar-Gaviria group has a policy of transferring its U.S. based representatives from city to city as they either get arrested or attract the attention of law enforcement. A manager who gets in trouble in Miami, for example, can expect to return to Medellin for a short time to "cool off," and will subsequently be sent to another U.S. city to work for the organization.

ASSESSMENT

The Escobar-Gaviria organization had been extending its activities and scope on a broader international scale, seeking expansion into markets in Europe and Asia. Recent Colombian government operations directed against the Medellin Cartel membership has disrupted cocaine production, curtailing these expansion efforts and resulting in dissatisfaction and restlessness among its membership. It is not known at this time what effect these operations will have on the long term makeup of the cartel membership.

BASIS OF INFORMATION

Information for this REI will be collected from debriefing of new/established sources who have access to the leadership, members and methods of operation of the Escobar-Gaviria organization and other Medellin Cartel members.

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

19 FEB 93 22 24Z

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

0027 MRI 01995

OO P12 FBIMM

DE BOG #0005 0502155

ZNY EEEEE

O 192153Z FEB 93

FM LEGAT BOGOTA (92B-MM-52044 SUB B) (P)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/IMMEDIATE/

FBI MIAMI/IMMEDIATE/

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

CITE: //5700:BOG043.050//

PASS: FBIHQ, CID, OC/DIS, C/SACU, ATTN: UC [redacted]

OLIA, FLU #2, ATTN: SSA [redacted] MIAMI FOR ASAC ROGER WHEELER

AND SA [redacted]

SUBJECT: PABLO EMILIO ESCOBAR GAVIRIA; THE MEDELLIN CARTEL;
COLOMBIAN/SOUTH AMERICAN DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION; REI -
DRUGS; OO: MIAMI.

92-19853-511

FOR THE INFORMATION OF RECIPIENTS, ON THE AFTERNOON OF
FEBRUARY 19, 1993, LEGAT, BOGOTA LEARNED THAT PABLO ESCOBAR'S

[redacted]

b6
b7C

O - CID, OIA

CC - OLIA

CC - DIVERS 7325

E Mail done on 2/22/93 [redacted] re Pablo Escobar

[redacted] WERE DETAINED AND PREVENTED FROM BOARDING A U.S. BOUND AIRPLANE AT THE MEDELLIN AIRPORT. PRELIMINARY INFORMATION SUGGESTS THAT THE DETENTION WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT [redacted] DID NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED AUTHORIZATION FROM [redacted] TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. THIS DETENTION CAUSED THE TRAVELLERS TO MISS THEIR SCHEDULED AVIANCA FLIGHT. b6 b7C

LEGAT DETERMINED THAT AVIANCA AIRLINES HAS DIRECT FLIGHT SERVICE FROM MEDELLIN, COLOMBIA TO MIAMI, FLORIDA. THE SCHEDULE IS AS FOLLOWS: AVIANCA FLIGHT NUMBER 060 DEPARTS MEDELLIN TUESDAY AND FRIDAY AT 0930 HOURS AND ARRIVES AT MIAMI AT 1230 HOURS; ON WEDNESDAY, THURSDAY, SATURDAY AND SUNDAY, AVIANCA FLIGHT NUMBER 060 DEPARTS MEDELLIN AT 0815 HOURS AND ARRIVES AT MIAMI AT 1120 HOURS. AVIANCA OFFERS NO FLIGHT SERVICE BETWEEN MEDELLIN AND MIAMI ON MONDAY.

LEGAT IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED PERSONS ARE UNDERTAKING A TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE PABLO ESCOBAR MADE A DECISION [redacted] TO LEAVE THEIR MEDELLIN RESIDENCE FOR THEIR OWN PERSONAL SAFETY. THIS PAST WEEK, "LOS PEPES" (PERSECUTED BY PABLO ESCOBAR), A SELF- b6 b7C

b6
b7C

PROCLAIMED ANTI-ESCOBAR GROUP, TOOK CREDIT FOR THE FIRE-BOMBING OF ESCOBAR'S [redacted] COUNTRY HOME AND AN ESCOBAR WAREHOUSE, WHICH HOUSED ESCOBAR'S PERSONAL COLLECTION OF VINTAGE AUTOMOBILES AND ANTIQUE PAINTINGS. BOTH STRUCTURES WERE REDUCED TO A FEW STANDING BLOCKS AND ASHES. THE ENTIRE ANTIQUE AUTO COLLECTION WAS DESTROYED.

LEGAT, BOGOTA IS FURNISHING THE ABOVE INFORMATION TO MIAMI WITH THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES IN MIND:

LEGAT IS OF THE OPINION THAT ESCOBAR WILL ENTRUST THE SAFETY OF [redacted] ONLY TO THOSE PERSONS WHO ARE STILL CLOSE TO HIM AND TOTALLY TRUSTED BY HIM. THUS, MIAMI MAY IDENTIFY ESCOBAR ASSOCIATES PRESENTLY IN MIAMI.

ONCE IDENTIFIED, MIAMI MAY WISH TO CONSIDER PLACING A PEN REGISTER AND/OR REVERSE TELEPHONE TRAP AT THE RESIDENCE/BUSINESS PLACE OF SUCH A TRUSTED PERSON, IN AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN COLOMBIAN TELEPHONE NUMBERS WHICH MAY DISCLOSE THE CURRENT WHEREABOUTS OF PABLO ESCOBAR.

FOR INFORMATION OF MIAMI, [redacted] WERE ESCORTED TO THE MEDELLIN AIRPORT BY APPROXIMATELY TWENTY (20) ARMED PERSONAL BODYGUARDS. LEGAT OPINES THAT PERSONS

PAGE FOUR DE BOG 0005 UNCLAS E F T O

MEETING [redacted] AT MIAMI WILL ALSO BE ARMED. DO THEY HAVE PERMITS FOR THEIR WEAPONS?

b6
b7C

THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS SUBMITTED FOR MIAMI'S CONSIDERATION. LEGAT WILL KEEP RECIPIENTS ADVISED OF ADDITIONAL DETAILS AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.

BT

#0005

NNNN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 30
Page 34 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 35 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 36 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 37 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 38 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 39 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 40 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 41 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 42 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 43 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 49 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 50 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 51 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 52 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 111 ~ Duplicate
Page 112 ~ Duplicate
Page 113 ~ Duplicate
Page 114 ~ Duplicate
Page 115 ~ Duplicate
Page 198 ~ Duplicate
Page 199 ~ Duplicate
Page 200 ~ Duplicate
Page 201 ~ Duplicate
Page 202 ~ Duplicate
Page 203 ~ Duplicate
Page 204 ~ Duplicate
Page 205 ~ Duplicate
Page 206 ~ Duplicate
Page 216 ~ b6, b7C, b7D
Page 217 ~ b6, b7C, b7D